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EMEBGENCY RENTAL BEGULATION
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EMERGENCY RENTAL
REGULATION
By WALTm F. DOPD*
As a result of the World War an acute shortage of houses
developed throughout practically all of the civilized countries.
Building operations were almost completely suspended over a
series of years, and existing dwellings were insufficient to house
properly the increasing population, and particularly the increasing
population of cities. This situation led to legislation not only in
the United States, but in many other parts of the world as well.
Great Britian sought to solve the problem by entering upon an
enormous enterprise of dwelling construction. Some states whose
constitutions permitted it (as New York and New Jersey) exempt-
ed new dwellings from taxation for a certain period of years.
Legislation for the purpose of directly or indirectly regulating
rates of rental was enacted by Congress for the District of Colum-
bia; by the legislature of Wisconsin for Milwaukee County; and
by New York, Massachusetts and Illinois. A full review of legis-
lation with respect to housing, and of the decisions under such
legislation through the year 1920, will be found in an article by
the present author and Carl H. Zeiss, on "Rent Regulation and the
Housing Problem," which appeared in the Journal of the American
Bar Association for January, 1921.
In connection with the important decisions upon this type of
legislation during the 'year 1921, it may be worth while to sum-
marize briefly the more important legislation having to do with the
regulation of rents.
The Ball rent law enacted on October 22, 1919,1 provided for a
commission with power to regulate the rental and matters of service
in connection with the letting of dwelling premises, business prop-
erty, and hotels within the District of Columbia. It also provided
that a tenant should not be evicted so long as .he paid the rent
* Member of the Chicago, IM1., Bar.
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fixed by the commission, unless the owner himself or a bona fide
purchaser from the owner, wished to occupy the premises. The
effect of this law was limited to two years, and a rental commis-
sion was promptly established under its terms. Congress had in
1918 passed the so-called Saulsbury resolution which prohibited
eviction within the District of Columbia so long as the tenant paid
the rent and behaved himself, unless the premises were required
by the landlord or a bona fide purchaser for occupation while in
government employ. The Saulsbury resolution was held invalid
by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in Willson v. Mc-
Donnell.2
At a special session held in 1920 a law was enacted in the state
of Wisconsin, effective June 9, 1920, giving the Railroad Commis-
sion of Wisconsin the power to fix reasonable rents in any city or
village in a county having a population of 250,000 or over. By its
terms this law was applicable only to Milwaukee County, and it
was to continue in effect only until April 30, 1923.
In 1920 several important acts were passed by the legislature
of New York for the regulation of rentals. Only the more im-
portant of these are here referred to. Chapters 942 and 947, Laws
of 1920, provided that there shall be no summary dispossession or
eviction where the tenant holds over after the expiratioif of his
term, unless the landlord proves him to be objectionable; or seeks
to occupy the premises himself; or desires to build a new building
for dwelling purposes, plans for which have already been filed
and approved; or has sold the building to a tenant's cooperative
owning corporation. Chapter 945, Laws of 1920, made it a defense
to a proceeding to dispossess, that the rent is unjust and unreason-
able, and the agreement oppressive. If this defense were interpos-
ed, the landlord was required within five days to file a bill of
particulars showing full facts with regard to his investment and
operating costs, from which the court might determine the reason-
ableness of the rent. Chapter 944, Laws of 1920, made it a defense
to an action for rent that the rent was unjust and unreasonable,
and the agreement under which it was sought to be recovered
unreasonable. Where it appeared that the rent had been increased
over the rent as it existed one year prior to the time of the agree-
ment under which the rent is sought to be recovered, such an agree-
anent was presumptively unjust, unreasonable, and oppressive.
This chapter amended chapter 136 of the regular 1920 Session
265 Fed. 432.
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Laws which made a 25 per cent increase presumptively unreason-
able, but which was found to be generally misunderstood. Chapters
942, 944 and 945 did not apply to new buildings. These acts were
to expire November 1, 1922. Several of the New York rental laws
applied only to New York City and surrounding communities.
Others applied to all cities of the first class.
By Chapter 577, General Acts of 1920, Massachusetts permitted
the court in summary proceedings for possession, where the ten-
ancy had terminated without the fault of the tenant, to grant a
stay where the tenant showed that he could not find suitable
premises elsewhere, the stay to be for not to exceed six months
in the discretion of the court. Pending the stay the tenant was
required to deposit in court the reasonable rental determined by
the court. Chapter 578 of Massachusetts General Acts of 1920
provided that unjust, unreasonable, and oppressive agreements for
rent should be unenforcible, and made a 25 per caent increase pre-
sumptively unreasonable. The Massachusetts laws were to be in
effect only until February 1, 1922.
By legislation of 1921, the Illinois General Assembly enacted
statutes providing that in forcible entry and detainer and in
ejectment cases, the court might in its discretion grant to a tenant
a stay of execution not exceeding six months from the expiration
of the term, or tenancy, upon the giving of bond by the tenant or
the paying of the total amount of the rental determined to be
due for the period of the stay. The court is authorized to fix the
compensation to the landlord during the period of the stay "at
the rate for which the defendant was liable as rent for the month
immediately prior to the expiration of his term or tenancy, plus
such additional amount, if any, as the court may determine to
be reasonable." The Illinois legislation ceases to be in effect
January'i, 1923.
From the review given above of legislation for the regulation
of rentals, it will be seen that this regulation falls into two classes:
(1) For the District of Columbia and for Milwaukee County, Wis-
consin, a direct power to fix rents was vested in an administrative
board, subject to judicial review. In these cases the rental of
dwelling property was regulated in much the same manner as
the rates and services of public utilities. (2) New York, Mas-
sachusetts, and Illinois, on the other hand, enacted legislation for
the purpose of preventing eviction, and vested in the courts in a
proper proceeding the authority to determine a reasonable rental
3
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upon which the tenant might remain in possession for a limited
time, if the court thought that he should not be evicted.
Rental legislation in all these states was definitely based upon
the existence of an emergency, and its continuance in force was
explicitly limited to a short period. Such legislation was broad
enough to cover not only new contracts of rental, but also existing
relations already entered into between landlord and tenant.
The Wisconsin legislation applicable to Milwaukee County was
held unconstitutional in the case of State ex rel Milwaukee Sales
and Investment Co. v. Railroad Commission of Wisconsin.6
The decision in Wisconsin may be dismissed without very full
comment. It was based upon the ground that the Wisconsin
statute denied the equal protection of the law because applicable
to communities in only one county of the state. The Wisconsin
decision in no way presented an issue as to the broad questions
regarding the validity of rent regulation, though the Wisconsin
court rejected a classification of large communities for this purpose
which was held proper by the United States Supreme Court in
passing upon the New York laws.
The New York Court of Appeals on March 8, 1921, decided
three cases directly involving the merits of the New York rental
statutes: People ex rel. Durham Realty Corporation v. La Fetra,4
Guttag v. Shatzkin,5 and Edgar A. Levy Leasing Company v.
Siegel."
In these three cases the court discussed with great fullness all
of the constitutional issues involved, and held the New York rental
statutes involved in these cases to be constitutional. Judge Crane
concurred in the result on the basis of a separate opinion in Guttag
v. Shatzkin; and Judge McLaughlin in the Siegel Case dissented
from the view taken in all three of the cases.
The chief constitutional objections urged against the New York
laws were: deprivation of property without due process of law,
denial of the equal protection of the laws, and impairment of the
obligations of contract. The majority of the court squarely took
the view that:
"Aside from the war power, the regulation of prices, ex-
cept for public utilities is unusual, although usury statutes
which forbid the taking of exorbitant interest on the loan of
183 N. W. 687 (Wis. 1921).
230 N. Y. 429.
230 N. Y. 634.
* 230 N. Y. 647.
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money are common. The power of regulation exists, however,
and is not limited to public uses or to property where the right
to demand and receive service exists or to monopolies or to
emergencies. It may embrace all cases of public interest, and
the question is whether the subject has become important
enough for the public to justify public action."
The court took the view that this legislation was enacted for the
purpose of meeting a real emergency, and that the obligation of
existing contracts might be impaired in the proper exercise of
legislative power. The court through Judge Pound said in the
La Fetra Case that:
"The conclusion is, in the light of present theories of the
police power, that the state may regulate a business, however
honest in itself, if it is or may become an instrument of wide-
spread oppression; . ... that the business of renting
homes in the city of New York is now such an instrument and
has, therefore, become subject to control by the public for the
common good; that the regulation of rents and the suspension
of possessory remedies so far tend to accomplish the purpose
as to supervene the constitutional inhibitions relied upon to
defeat the laws before us."
Judge Crane in his concurring opinion emphasized the temporary
character of the New York legislation.
In the case in which Judge McLaughlin dissented, a renewal
lease entered into before the passage of the act was directly in-
volved. Judge McLaughlin took the view that it was a deprivation
of property without due process of law, and a denial of the equal
protection of the laws, to force upon the landlord a tenant during
a two-year period, if the tenant desired to remain, but without
any correlative obligation upon the part of the tenant. He also
took the view that to require, the landlord to submit to the rental
to be fixed by the court, and the denial to him of the right to
recover his property, constituted an unconstitutional deprivation
of propeity. He contended also that the act denied the equal pro-
tection of the laws in that it adopted one rule for the owner of
property completed at the time the act was passed, and another as
to buildings completed or constructed after the passage of the act.
Finally, Judge McLaughlin urged that the New York legislation
took private property for a private use in that it gave to one
private individual a definite right in property of another individual.
The New York legislation came before the Supreme Court of the
United States in the case of Marcus Brown Holding Company v.
5
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Feldman, on appeal from the United States District Court for the
southern district of New York, less than a month and a half after
the decision of the New York Court of Appeals.7
The Feldman Case was decided at the same time as the case of
Block v. Hirsh,8 upholding the validity of the Rental Commission
Act for the District of Columbia, and the two decisions must of
necessity be discussed together. Justice Holmes speaking for a
bare majority of the court in these two cases upheld both the act
as to the District of Columbia and the New York rental legislation.
Justice Holmes took the broad view that these acts are constitu-
tional as a means of meeting a great and immediate necessity. In
the New York case the court assumed that an emergency existed,
and said:
"The chief objection to these acts has been dealt with in
Block v. Hirsh. In the present case more emphasis is laid
upon the impairment of the obligation of the contract of the
lessees to surrender possession and of the new lease which was
to have gone into effect upon October 1, last year. But con-
tracts are made subject to this exercise of the power of the
state when otherwise justified, as we have held this to be."
It was urged that the New York laws were discriminatory both
as to cities affected, and because not extending to new buildings or
buildings then in course of erection. The court replied to this:
"But as the evil to be met was a very pressing want of
shelter in certain crowded centers the classification was too
obviously justified to need explanation, beyond repeating what
was said below as to new buildings, that the unknown cost of
completing them and the need to encourage such structures
sufficiently explain the last item on the excepted list."
In the case of Block v. Hirsh, the court more fully discussed the
general merits of the legislation in dispute, and said: "Plainly,
circumstances may so change in time or so differ in space as to
clothe with such an interest what at other times or in other places
would be a matter of purely private concern;" and added that "All
the elements of a public interest justifyng some degree of public
control are present."
Justice McKenna presented in dissenting opinions the views of
four members of the court, urging that the District of Columbia
and New York rent laws directly violate constitutional guarantees
• 41 Sup. Ct 465 (U. S. 1921).
S 41 Sup. Ct. 549 (U. S. 1921).
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as to due process of law, equal protection of the laws, and the obli-
gation of contracts. In the dissenting opinion in the Block v.
Hirsh cage, Justice McKenna indulged in a good deal of generaliza-
tion as to the tearing down of constitutional rights, and urged that
the majority view of the court set no definite bounds to the exercise
of the power held proper. Justice MeKenna sought to dismiss the
point that the legislation both in New York and for the District
of Columbia was for a limited period of time, and said:
"If it can be made to endure for two years, it can be made
to endure for more. There is no other power that can pro-
nounce the limit of its duration against the time expressed in
it, and its justification practically marks the doom of the
judicial judgment on legislative action."
It is doubtful whether Justice McKenna in speaking for a
minority of the court was justified in his broad language regarding
the complete break-down of judicially enforced limitations upon
legislative power, through the action of the majority in the two
cases before the United States Supreme Court. Clearly, there
was in fact an emergency as to the housing situation, and clearly
also there was need for some governmental action to meet this
emergency. Such governmental action through the legislative de-
partment was before the court, limited to a definite period, and
safeguarded in such a manner as to protect the landlord in such a
rental as might be determined by judicial action to be reasonable.
This involved no material or permanent breakdown of constitu-
tional guarantees; nor did it involve a judicial sanction for a legis-
lative embarcation upon unlimited projects for the regulation of
prices. The decision 'of the New York Court of Appeals contains
broader statements than do the opinions of Justice Holmes;
but such broad statements are easily limited to the facts before the
court.
It is doubtful whether the courts of this country will be per-
manently influenced in their attitude upon matters of social and
industrial legislation by the decisions of the New York Court of
Appeals and of the United States Supreme Court, with respect to
the temporary regulation of rentals during a time of great emer-
geney. The decisions of these courts can easily be limited to the
situations which presented themselves, and need in no way be
extended to justify permanent price-fixing under governmental
authority. However, should other situations present themselves
similar to those with respect to the rental of dwelling property,
7
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the courts may be expected to recognize this fact and under such
conditions to apply principles similar to those announced by the
majority of the United States Supreme Court.
The decisions in these cases justify no great alarm upon the
part of those opposed to further governmental regulation, and no
great encouragement to those favoring such a policy. Yet they
do make it clear that private rights may not defeat governmental
power to meet new problems as they arise. The limits of such
governmental power are, however, as fully subject to judicial
determination as heretofore; and no new principle has been laid
down for the judicial determination of such limits. Although a
liberal view has been taken in these cases, each new issue under
the police power remains for decision upon its own particular
facts. The liberality of the court in one case establishes no legal
guidance as to the view which may be taken in the next. In these
cases the New York Court of Appeals and the United States
Supreme Court but recognize the shifting nature of the police
power. Judge Pound sums up the situation in the statement that:
"The law of each age is ultimately what that age thinks should
be the law." Of course, in the adaptation of broad constitutional
provisions to new social needs, the courts are occasionally a genera-
tion behind, but the fact remains that the shifting lines of legisla-
tive power must in each doubtful case be finally drawn by judicial
action.9
" For recent discussions of rent regulation, see: Charles K. Burdick, "Constitu-
tionality of the New York Rent Laws," 6 CORNELL L. QUAR. 310; George w. Wicker-
sham, "The Police Power and the New York Emergency Rent Laws," 69 U. OF PA. L.R8v. 301; Nathan Isaacs, "The Revival of the Justum Pretium," 6 CORNELL L. QuAn.881.
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